Sanjay Kumar Bhuwalka, Neeraj Jain Versus Union of India

2018 (10) TMI 1241 – CALCUTTA HIGH COURT – 2018 (19) G. S. T. L. 591 (Cal.) – GST default – Bail application – offence committed under Section 132(1)( c) read with Section 132(5) of the Central Goods & Services Act, 2017 – Relaxation and/or modification and/or waiver of the conditions of the bail – Held that:- GST Authority and their Investigating Officer has failed to submit charge sheet against the petitioners and even no extension of time to complete the investigation has been sought for by them.

The courts cannot extend investigation period under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

This Court is pleased to relax the conditions of bail imposed by this Court’s order dated July 12, 2018 so as to enable their release on bail as they have statutory right to be released and further bearing in mind the principles as to presumption of innocence and the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and accordingly the petitioners be releas

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h a further direction to appear before the Investigating Officer/Authority holding investigation to assist the investigating machinery as and when called upon and to appear before the authority concerned till the final investigation or till the offence is compounded under the provision subject to the satisfaction of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sealdah and the said order was further modified by order dated July 12, 2018 to the extent that the petitioners be enlarged on bail by furnishing personal recognition bond of ₹ 10 lakh each and on further condition to deposit of the evaded amount respectively. The petitioners were arrested on May 12, 2018 and are still in custody and they have not been able to be released on bail by furnishing bond with the conditions as imposed by the order dated July 12, 2018. Learned advocate for the petitioners has sought for relaxation of conditions of bail pursuant to the order passed by the Hon ble Apex Court in Special Leave to

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nder Section 132(1)( c) read with Section 132(5) of the Central Goods & Services Act, 2017 to argue that the present petitioners be released on bail on furnishing bail bond because he is languishing in jail beyond the statutory period. Mr. Moitra also relied on a decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Raj Kumar Aggarwal v. Director General, Central Excise, reported in 147(2008) DLT 1 to argue that on the similar circumstances the petitioner could not get release and my attention is invited to the observation in paragraph 17 which reads thus:- the use of these words inter alia under Section 437(3) and 438(1)(b)(2) of the Cr.P.C, that is no reason to make a distinction between the word conditions of bail or terms of bail either in the context of Section 167(2) or Chapter-XXXIII. They have been employed as synonymous of each other. In Sreenivasulu Reddy v. State of Tamil Nadu VII (2000) CCR 96 the accused had already deposited a sum of ₹ 35 crore out of the ₹ 50 crore

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to a Court to grant or refuse bail it was impermissible for it to assume that an offence has been committed even at the stage of grant of bail and to direct repayment of any amount is both onerous and unwarranted. In Amarjit Singh v. State ( NCT of Delhi) 2002(61) DRJ 67, after adverting to Sandeep Jain, the Supreme Court had recorded that ? We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the imposition of condition to deposit the sum of ₹ 15,00,000/- in the form of an FDR in the Trial Court is an unreasonable condition. In M.R. Narayanan v. State 103(2003) DLT 434, applying the ratio in Sreenivasulu Reddy is was concluded that conditions akin to deposit of money ought not to be imposed as a ground for grant of bail; that conditions/terms are imposed solely to ensure the presence of the accused at the time of trial. The only situation where money may be deposited in fact arises from the volition of the accused. This is where the required person by any Court to execute a bo

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& Ors. v. State of Maharastra & Ors., reported in (1994)4 SCC 602 to the observation made in paragraph 21 which is to the following effect quoted:- Thus, we find that once the period for filing the charge-sheet has expired and either no extension under Clause (bb) has been granted by the Designated Court or the period of extension has also expired, the accused person would be entitled to move an application for being admitted to bail under sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA read with Section 167 of the Code and the Designated Court shall release him on bail. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the expiry of the period during which investigation is required to be completed under Section 20(4) TADA read with Section 167 of the Code, the court must release the accused on bail on its own motion even without any application from an accused person on his offering to furnish bail. In our opinion an accused is required to make an appl

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prosecutor to the Designated Court for grant of extension under clause (bb), its notice should be issued to the accused before granting such an extension so that an accused may have an opportunity to oppose the extension on all legitimate and legal grounds available to him. It is true that neither clause(b) nor clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 TADA specifically provide for the issuance of such a notice but in our opinion the issuance of such a notice must be read into these provisions both in the interest of the accused and the prosecution as well as for doing complete justice between the parties. This is a requirement of the principles of natural justice and the issuance of notice to the accused or the public prosecutor, as the case may be, would accord with fair play in action, which the courts have always encouraged and even insisted upon. It would also strike a just balance between the interest of the liberty of an accused on the other hand. There is no prohibition to

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. In case of State of Maharashtra v. Bharati Chandmal Verma (Mrs) Alias Ayesha Khan; reported in (2002) 2 SCC 121, reference is made to the following effect:- For the application of the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code there is no necessity to consider when the investigation could regally have commenced. That proviso is intended only for keeping an arrested person under detention fr the purpose of investigation and the legislature has provided a maximum period for such detention. On the expiry of the said period the further custody becomes unauthorized and hence it is mandated that the arrested person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. It may be a different position if the same accused was found to have been involved in some other offence disconnected from the offence for which he was arrested. In such an eventuality the officer investigating such second offence can exercise the power of arresting him in connection with the second case. But if th

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charge sheet is filed, the so-called indefeasible right of the accused would not stand extinguished thereby, and on the other hand, the accused has to be released on bail. The Court further proceeded to say that such an accused, thus is entitled to be released on bail in enforcement of his indefeasible right will, however, have to be produced before the Magistrate on a charge-sheet being filed in accordance with Section 209 and the Magistrate must deal with him in the matter of remand to custody subject to the provisions of the Code relating to and subject to the provisions of cancellation of bail, already granted in accordance with law laid down by the Court in case of Mohd. Iqbal(supra). In the case of Rajnikant Jivanlal & Anr. v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi, reported in (1989) 3 SCC 532 my attention is invited to paragraph 13 of the cited decision which reads thus:- an order for release on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) may appropriately be

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ity and their Investigating Officer has failed to submit charge sheet against the petitioners and even no extension of time to complete the investigation has been sought for by them. In respectful consideration of the principles laid down in the cited decisions and further in view of latest decision of the Hon ble Apex Court that the courts cannot extend investigation period under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court is pleased to relax the conditions of bail imposed by this Court s order dated July 12, 2018 so as to enable their release on bail as they have statutory right to be released and further bearing in mind the principles as to presumption of innocence and the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and accordingly the petitioners be released on furnishing personal bond of ₹ 50,00,000/- each to the satisfaction of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sealdah. Thus, CRAN 2698 of 2018 and CRAN 2700 of 2018 are

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